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INTRODUCTION

Inevitably the results of concentration so endlessly discussed by
economists ' find reflection in the legal system. The modem state,
having ultimate responsibility for the national economy, necessarily
sought the production of conditions by industry which would satisfy
the political demands. A variety of tools lie to the hand of the political
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Assistant Secretary
of State of the United States, 1938-1944; Ambassador to Brazil, 1944-1946. Author
of various books and of articles in legal and other periodicals.
1. The discussion of concentration in American economics has been continuous
and intense for more than two decades. Among more recent discussions may be noted:
WILCox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERIcAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph
21, 1941) ; STocKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1951) (and
the report of the Committee of which James N. Landis, Esq., was Chairman, concluding, among other things, concentration should be discouraged except where
definite justification for it could be presented); WARmEN, EXTENT OF ENTRPRISE
MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899-1939 (1951) (a part of the so-called "Free
Market" study at the University of Chicago), raising the question as to whether
concentration really does exist and contesting in some degree the conclusions of Dr.
Wilcox; Adelman, Measurenwnt of Industrial Concentration, 33 REV. OF ECON. &
STAT. (1951). Professor Adelman's research is both the most modem and the most
detached. His conclusion is that 45% of the assets of all manufacturing corporations is concentrated in the 139 largest American corporations.
This is pure property concentration: it takes no account of the secondary effects
as, for instance, the amount of "small business" whose policies and conduct is dictated by the concentrate on which it depends as, for instance, motor dealers depend
on the great motor companies or gasoline stations on the oil companies. In any case,
Professor Adelman's figure is impressive enough. The output of American manufacture is roughly half of the manufacturing output of the entire world: 45% of
American manufacturing assets and approximately that of its product is probably the
greatest concentration of economic power ever achieved in modem history.
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state. It can impose requirements. It can offer privileges, advantages,
and subsidies maximizing probability of profit. It can supply capital.
It can, if need be, own businesses, and as an ultimate resource can take
over almost any given corporation (of significant scope) in any industry.
But the modern state must likewise cope with the desires of many
millions of individuals. The problem is not one of aggregates or general economics. It is matter of individual application. A man wants
his job; a family wishes to buy, at an acceptable price, goods and
services it needs or strongly desires. In the field of labor (which lies
aside from this study) organized groups insist that their numbers
shall be able to get jobs, or perhaps keep them on some sort of determined tenure, and at an acceptable wage scale.
Save in the field of labor, where the growth of labor unions has
compelled rapid and more or less systematic development, the evolution of law has been largely unsystematic. It has grown out of a series
of major or minor crises, all of which have a common element. In each
case the industry concerned failed to meet some widespread demand in
some quarter of the community with which it dealt. This generated
political action energizing intervention in one form or another by the
political state.
The solutions arrived at from these impacts have taken form in
law. The forms are diverse, but as a group they indicate a pattern
which steadily repeats itself. It is therefore allowable to predict that
future impacts will be similarly solved. This is the basis for sug2
gesting that new fields of law are in process of emergence.
Of interest is the fact that the emergent fields of law do not base
themselves on particular or formal "corporation law." American corporations are theoretically subject to a formal, but, for economic purposes, largely nominal control by the law of the state in which they
are incorporated. This, only incidentally important here, is the true
"corporation law," the state statutes by which the creation and administration of a corporation are regulated. Under this law the corporation acquires its charter, which is its constitution, and sets up its
by-laws, which govern its internal procedure and functioning and the
method of holding its stockholders' and directors' meetings by which
corporate action is taken. Most statutes leave the widest latitude to
the corporation and its stockholders to set up their own methods of
2. The administration of antitrust law is one of the legal tools which has been
invoked by the state. See Carlston, Anti-Trust Policy: A Problent in Statecraft,
60 YALE L.J. 1073 (1951). Professor Carlston's point is that the anti-trust laws are
really used to try to establish and enforce norms of corporate behavior, and that the
fundamental problem dealt with is that of distribution of power in the community.
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procedure. This law determines the property interests of stockholders,
their share in the corporate income, and the like, again leaving great
capacity in the corporation managers and shareholders to determine
these interests by agreement.
In earlier days, this branch of law likewise regulated the relations
of the enterprise to the community. The old royal charters in England
were designed not only to create a collective body capable of doing
business and to endow that body with certain powers, but also to obtain from it certain results. Specially chartered corporations of the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were far more than
devices by which a number of individuals could jointly go into business
with limited liability. They were expected, perhaps required, to perform stated duties to the community--perhaps running a ferry, founding a colony or establishing the East Indian trade. Performance of
these functions and securing whatever revenue the enterprise paid to
the Crown were the primary reasons why a charter was granted.
For practical purposes, the prevailing corporation laws have relinquished the objective either of imposing social duties or of protecting
individuals. They merely grant the privilege of carrying on an enterprise in corporate form, afford a vehicle for establishing stockholders'
contractual rights, and establish a method by which boards of directors,
officers and personnel may manage. The attempts to limit by charter
the size or the scope of operations, or to guide into, or hold operations
in, some specific field of activity, have been substantially abandoned.
Provisions imposing some degree of social control, or directing corporate action for community purposes, were, indeed, a feature of the
early American special charters, and were carried forward into many
of the nineteenth century state statutes permitting incorporation.' Tke
device failed, and practically every state has eliminated these provisions,
though there remains a remnant of legal doctrine which can occasionally
be taken hold of under unusual circumstances.4 It is a curious fact
3. See, e.g., Mass. Laws Jan. Sess. 1818, c. 179, An Act to Incorporate the Proprietors of the Maine Flour Mills. This Act constituted a corporation for the purpose of manufacturing corn and grain into meal and flour. It limited the property
holdings to $30,000 worth of real estate, all to be located in the County of Kennebec,
and personal property to the value of $20,000. It required the corporation to brand
the containers of its flour or meal, under a penalty of $2.00 for each container not
so branded; and at the same time provided a penalty of $20.00 for each offense in
case any party other than the corporation should use the corporate brand.
Instances could be multiplied.
Recently a careful history of the corporation laws in" the state of New Jersey
has appeared, CADUAxi, THE CoRpoRATioN IN Naw JERsEy (1950). The development
is entirely clear. In the early part of the 19th century, the act of incorporation was
a state act, designed to get a specified commercial result, but under private financing
and operation.
4. Failure of the device was accomplished partly by the nullification of the judicial decision of the doctrine of ultra vires, e.g., Jacksonville, M., P. Ry. v. Hooper,
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that, in mid-twentieth century practice, in the many struggles between the corporation and the state, classic corporation law is almost
never availed of to adjust relations between the corporate enterprise
and the community. That law is vigorously used to adjust relationships between management and stockholders, between stockholders
themselves, and occasionally between the enterprise and creditors.
But in regulating relationships between the corporation and the community or in protecting individuals, it is not now used, and there is
little sign that future developments will turn on corporation statutes.
Though true corporation law has abandoned the task of regulating relations between the corporation and the community, the large
corporation, monopoly or concentrate (and in some cases highly competitive, multi-unit industries) is encountering a rapidly growing and
extremely powerful field of law, quasi-law, and public expectations as
to conduct hardening into law. With this newer field this study is
principally concerned.

This new law is crystallizing in two distinct areas.
One area (not dealt with in this paper except incidentally) embraces the economic and political-economic obligations and privileges,
through which and by which the industry is expected to produce an
economic result acceptable to the community. In it, the corporation,
or a concentrate of corporations, is dealt with as an entity; the objective of this area of law is to provide such generalized effects as adequate
supply of the product, an acceptable price, reasonable stability of operations and employment, and so forth. This is, really, the gradual
building of a system of industrial planning.
The other area, far less defined, includes a body of rules governing the rights and position of individuals with whom the corporation
deals as supplier.
These two fields of emergent law may be briefly described.
160 U.S. 514 (1896), considerably enlarging the doctrine of "incidental powers," and
the application of the doctrine of estoppel to those attempting to assert ultra vires,
until the doctrine was cut down to the extremely limited proportions set out in Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Stephens, 214 N.Y. 488, 108 N.E. 856 (1915). The
draftsmen of the Ohio Corporation Law in 1928 endeavored to wipe out even the
remnants of the doctrine by providing that a corporation should have all the powers
which natural persons would have. However guidance of corporate enterprise in
accepted social channels was to be made, the corporation law had not proved a feasible means.
Recognition of this fact did not, however, eliminate the problem. Corporations
were and are the largest collectivities known in the American jurisprudence outside
the government itself; some of them (American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
General Motors) are larger on any standard of comparison than the smaller or less
populous American states.
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In point of fact when the community is dissatisfied with the
economic situation prevailing in any given iridustry, political pressures
are set up; and the state is necessarily brought into contact with the
chief units in the industry. Especially when the industry is a monopoly, or a concentrate of large corporations, these corporations find
themselves immediately dealing with the Government, which transmits the pressure on it to the chief elements in the industry to satisfy
the community's desire. Occasionally an abuse can be rectified or
condition created by simple fiat, the state by appropriate legislation
insisting that the industry change its course of action in some respect.
More often the industry immediately responds that it also is in the grip
of economic conditions, and that if it is to be used as an instrumentality
to meet the community's desire, conditions must be changed, or additional resources must be given. The ensuing result is a crude plan,
indicating the objective desired, indicating the obligations imposed on
the industry, or at least a method by which they can be made specific,
and as often as not providing for assistance by the Government in
one form or another. Occasionally there is direct Government entry
into the industry. The result is usually reached by a combination of
pressures on the industry, drawn from existing or newly created law
or from public opinion, and by counter-pressure exerted by the industry itself, which freely and forcibly asserts its own interest and necessities. Both demands have to be considered and met, for unless
the state proposes to take over and administer the industry itself, it
is obliged to recognize the claims of the industry to the extent they
are reasonable as well as the claims of the public. Until both are
recognized, and satisfied to the point of reaching a viable result, the
period of impact and crisis*continues. When solution has been reached
offering a reasonable result, a period of more or less stable legal and
economic relationships follows.
The chronicle of industrial crises and impacts of this kind forms
a great and familiar part of American political and economic history
to which brief allusion may be made here.
Five chief methods of resolving these crises and impacts have
appeared in the American legal system.
(1) The impact may be resolved by the passage, after political
conflict, of legislation applicable to a particular industry, creating a
framework within which that industry shall operate and develop. Thus,
interstate railroads, after a series of impacts lasting more than twenty
years, came under such a scheme for practical purposes in 1903 when
the ineffective Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was amended and took
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its present basic form in legislation, stimulated by President Theodore
Roosevelt and sponsored. by Senator Hepburn.5 This base, extended
from time to time but not radically altered, furnished the framework
within which American railroads have since operated for nearly half
a century. A specific statutory plan emerged for the maritime industry
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.0 Great parts of the electrical
power industry have been dealt with likewise, though the development
in that field has been so rapid that the pattern has probably not yet
fully emerged. Thus, the Tennessee Valley Authority 7 handles the
electric power problem in that great watershed, and the Boulder Canyon
Project Act8 and the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 ' perform, in
less complete fashion, the same function for the areas in the valleys
of the Colorado and Columbia Rivers. The interstate phases of the
industry are regulated by the Federal Power Act of 1935, while a
national pattern of "integrated systems" is imposed by the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.10 The oil industry succeeded
in working out a pattern of production stabilization under the Interstate Oil Compact, 1 a treaty made between some twenty-four states
calling for a common policy of oil conservation, and approved biennially
by the Congress of the United States. The list, which runs all the
way from aviation to stockyards and takes in sugar, radio and commercial banking, could be multiplied.
These and other specific solutions usually reflect the end of a
struggle, or at least a struggle in process of solution, involving an
5. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended by the "Hep-

burn Act," 34 STAT. 584 (1906). The provisions of both acts are now dispersed
through 49 U.S.C. (1946).
6. 49 STAT. 1985 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1946). This Act dissolved the
old Shipping Board and transferred its regulatory powers to the newly created Maritime Commission.
7. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ACT OF 1933, 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.
§ 831 et seq. (1946). See HODGE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, A NATIONAL
EXPERIMENT IN REGIONALISM (1948).
8. BOULDER CANYON PRoJEcT ACT, 45 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U.S.C. §617 et
seq. (1946); BOULDER CANYON PROJFcT ADJUSTMENT ACT, 54 STAT. 774 (1940),
43 U.S.C. § 618 et seq. (1946) ; and the powers given to the Secretary of the Interior thereunder. Upon these Acts depend the Imperial Irrigation District and the
Parker Dam, separately authorized by the RIVERS AND HARBORS IMPROVEMENT ACT
OF 1935, 49 STAT. 1028 (1935).
9. 50 STAT. 720 (1937), 16 U.S.C. § 832 et seq. (1946). A number of related
operations arose from this core for the development of the Colorado River, notably
the Grand Coulee Dam, constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation; see Rivers and
Harbors Improvement Act of 1935, § 2, 49 STAT. 1039-1040 (1935).
10. PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935, 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15
U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1946), which relates to powers of the Securities and Exchange
Commission with respect to holding companies; FEDERAL PoWER ACT, 49 STAT. 838
(1935), 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. (1946), which gives the Federal Power Commission
jurisdiction over the interstate transmission of electric energy.
11. INTERSTATE COMPACT TO CONSERVE OIL AND GAS (1935), the text of which
is contained in 57 STAT. 383 (1943).
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entire industry. Some were reached by relativ ly amicable discussion.
More of them emerged as a result of pitched battles whose records
2
filled the current newspapers and furnish material for historians.1
In these instances, attacks were made, forces marshalled, the lines met,
points of view were stated, grievances were exhibited, defenses were
made, interest was asserted and, through political action, a balance
of some sort was reached.
(2) A second group of solutions have resulted from court action
taken by the Federal Government and based on highly generalized rules
of law such as the antitrust acts. Attack is made on a specific corporation or group of corporations, and by judicial decree a norm of
conduct for that corporation is laid down, theoretically capable of being
enforced in the courts. Where there is a developing impact of an
industry-concentrate upon the state, this is one of the classic methods
by which solution is initially attempted. The most familiar of these
generalized rules of law, invoked to meet an industrial situation, is
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 which, for practical purposes, was
not seriously used until 1903.13 From then on, during half a century,
the singularly general rule, prohibiting "monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade" or "conspiracy to restrain trade," has been the
tool most frequently used. Clash of a corporation with the state is
12. A relatively amicable solution (for better or worse) was reached when the
Acr OF 1948, 61 STAT. 922 (1947), 7 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (Supp. 1951),
was passed. For practical purposes, the terms of the Act were settled by discussions
between representatives of the Louisiana cane sugar producers, the American beet
sugar producers, the Hawaiian and Puerto Rican cane sugar producers, and the representatives of the great sugar refining companies, together with representatives of the
Cuban sugar producers. As a result, the Secretary of Agriculture determines the
amount of sugar needed to meet consumer requirements of the continental United
States, and sets a quota limiting the amount of raw sugar which may be imported.
The government was prepared to enter these discussions because of its desire to protect the cane and Western beet sugar farmers, and also provide a stable supply of
refined sugar for the East.
This may be contrasted with the head-on collision occasioning much
of the public
utilities legislation, where a running political battle over many years culminated in
a Senate investigation conducted by Senator Hugo Black, and a commercial battle
of epic proportions developed prior to the passage of 'the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. An earlier instance was the passage of the Hepburn Act giving the
Federal Government power to regulate railway rates in 1903; President Theodore
Roosevelt was accused (even then l) of having yielded to "Communist" influence.
13. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946). Serious use of the Antitrust
Act was first made by President Theodore Roosevelt during his first term and the
Act was still more vigorously used by his successor, President William Howard
Taft. The Sherman Act was then conceived of as a means of preventing monopolies
and large aggregations of capital. Yet even in the early cases a decree of "dissolution" became a form of disposition of the industrial resources. The pattern familiar
today of splitting an industry into a concentrate of three companies appears first in
U.S. v. du Pont de Nemours Company, 188 Fed. 127 (C.C. Del. 1911), nodified, 273
Fed. 869 (D. Del. 1921), familiarly known as the "Powder Trust Case." There
the decree directed the du Pont Company to equip, staff and finance two other powder
companies, Hercules and Atlas. The three-company concentrate has dominated the
gun powder industry ever since.
SuGA
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frequently evidenced first by a brush with the Department of Justice
under the antitrust laws. In many instances, the law has been interpreted so as virtually to give to the federal courts the power to
work out, ad hoc, plans of relationship between corporations found
to have violated the law and the economic community in which they
operate. Decrees under the antitrust law more often than not are in
the nature of special judicial legislation designed to govern specific
phases of the conduct of the corporation or group of corporations
brought before the court. In some cases, these decrees attain the
stature of a rudimentary plan for the industry.
. (3) Another avenue toward solution appears through exercise
of power, obtained by some strong Government administrative agency
for quite different purposes, which by circumstance gives that agency
a strategically decisive position in an industry. A typical case of this
sort is found in the handling of the aluminum manufacturing situation
by the War Assets Administration and the Surplus Property Board.14
Those agencies, having power to dispose of Government-owned war
plants for the manufacture of aluminum and following standards laid
down by Congress, were able to erect a new pattern for the aluminum
industry, substituting, in effect, a three-company concentrate for a
single-company monopoly. It is probable that the National Production Authority under the current Defense Production Act may find'
itself with similar power in other industries. In these cases the commanding position of the Government was acquired "accidentally"; that
is, it came as an incident of operations primarily intended to achieve
quite different results.
(4) In a fourth group of cases control is exercised because the
Government itself, directly or indirectly, enters the industry and undertakes operations. Two illustrations of this are the entry of the Government in 1935 15 into the field of rural electrification through the
14. Lengthy litigation resulted in a decision, U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), that the Aluminum Company of America was a monopoly
and should be split into a number of component parts. The case was remanded for
decree. But meanwhile the Surplus Property Board (later the War Assets Administration) bad virtually set up the Reynolds Metal Company and the Permanente
Company (now the Kaiser Aluminum Company) as co-producers. Accordingly
the final decree did not dissolve Aluminum Company of America, but merely required
its severance from its Canadian affiliate, Aluminium Company, Ltd.
15. The rural electrification program began under Exec. Order No. 7130 (1935),
under the EMERGENCy RELIEF APPROPRIATION AcT OF 1935, 49 STAT. 115 (1935).
The Rural Electrification Authority in its present form was set up by the RURAL
In
ELETRPFICATIozr AcT OF 1936, 49 STAT. 1363, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1946).
theory, both operations were designed to authorize the lending of money for rural
electrification; but, no barriers appearing, the organization of cooperatives for this
distribution was proposed by Mr. Murray Lincoln, encouraged by the Rural Electri-
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Rural Electrification Authority, and its entrance in 1933 into the field
of capital banking through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
One may argue whether the Tennessee Valley and the Columbia River
operations fall into this class. 16
(5) Fifth, there are pressures not yet hardened into any form of
law, but solidly based on the wants and expectations of the community.
To violate these settled expectations entails immediate controversy,
leading to political action, and very probably to invocation of one or
more of the methods of control mentioned above. When an industry
finds itself under investigation by a Congressional committee or engaged in a political battle in which it answers criticism, or endeavors
to fend off adverse legislation and the like, it is under pressure. Some
community want or expectation has not been fulfilled; some norm of
expected conduct has been violated; at all events, political pressure
has developed. By following this area of controversy and estimating
the political pressure, one can almost forecast the area of development
of the explicit law of tomorrow. Many industries, some concentrated
and some frankly monopolistic, have avoided serious impact with the
state because of the care with which they have anticipated these community expectations and the fidelity with which they have fulfilled
them. One of the largest corporations in the United States is the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company; it has held a substantial
monopoly over a vital community service for many decades; yet its
standards of performance have so well satisfied the community that
impacts between it and the state have been singularly slight as in7
dustrial history goes.'
fication Administrator, Mr. Morris Cooke, and the resulting program amounted to
supplying not only capital but research, technical assistance, and planning, so that
the bulk of the operating decisions may fairly be said to be made by an agency
of the Federal Government.
16. Unquestionably the Federal Government intervened for direct production of
power in both the Tennessee Valley and the Colorado River projects, as indeed
President Hoover's Administration did when it authorized construction of Boulder
Dam. Yet in all three cases, the primary motive was less an attempt to provide a
framework for the power industry than to make available resources to areas which
clearly needed them. Later, of course, the projects developed both as great regional
developments and as "yard sticks" by which it was thought the performance of
private utility companies could be judged.
17. A useful study could be made of the great corporations forming concentrates
in particular industries whose operations have not brought them into serious controversy with public opinion and therefore have occasioned only a slight impact
between their operations and those of the state. Besides AT&T, the motor industry
has been in the main very successful in this respect, as has also the electrical supply
industry. More recently, however, the electrical supply industry has been forced
into contact with the state because of the extreme interrelation of defense orders
with electronics and because of the fact that the American electronics industry almost
of necessity comes into contact with the highly concentrated European electronics
industry. The European system is, of course, a cartelized system, and the interaction
of the two systems has produced a modicum of conflict in the United States.
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II

The second field of growing law, with which this article is chiefly
concerned, is the tendency to give specific constitutional or legal protection to individuals in their dealings with private units wielding great
economic power. This is a distinctly American development in a
period characterized by mass demand for better standards of living and
for a modicum of justice in economic matters. Both by history and
tradition, American thought and American law shrink from the assumption that individuals are merely members of a group. They, as
men and women, have individual claims on society just as they have
individual duties to it. These rights and duties can be economic as
well as political; the full scope of the individual guarantees contained
in the Bill of Rights is not exhausted by providing for the political
and intellectual freedoms there prescribed. Protection of life, liberty
and property contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
though speaking the old language of possessory property and of individuals defending themselves against arbitrary feudal government,
does at least set up the implication that corresponding protection exists
where the individual derives his economic life not from possessory
property, but from position in a modern industrial world.
From this there is being generated a quiet translation of constitutional law from the field of political to the field of economic rights.
The main outlines of this new body of law are only scarcely discernible
now; yet its future history is certain to be important. Certain quasiconstitutional rules governing the behavior of corporations, and of
the officials within them, are beginning to be imposed by the courts
and by public opinion. Their extension may determine the course
of American economic development as clearly as did the constitutional
thinking of Madison and Jefferson in the political field a century and
a half ago. The emerging principle appears to be that the corporation,
itself a creation of the state, is as subject to constitutional limitations
which limit action as is the state itself. If this doctrine, now coming
into view, is carried to full effect, a corporation having economic and
supposedly juridical power to take property, to refuse to give equal service, to discriminate between. man and man, group and group, race and
race, to an extent denying "the equal protection of the laws," or otherwise to violate constitutional limitations, is subject to direct legal action.' 8
18. On closer historical analysis, the parallel between the position attained by an
industrial concentrate and that of the feudal system is surprisingly close. The
feudal lord was the operator of the principal economic activity, namely, use of agricultural land, and he likewise controlled the marketing of goods and products in
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The doctrine should not be surprising. On logical analysis, a
corporation, being a creature of the state, which owned, let us say, a
dominant department or chain store system, could not offer its facilities
to white men and refuse them to Negroes; could not, through whim
or dislike, refuse to serve a family or a customer which it disliked;
could not give undue favors to a group it wished to foster at the expense of the rest of its public. This would be true despite the fact that,
as owner, it could theoretically do what it pleased with its own property. And this legal restraint would apply not only to rules embodied
in the corporation's constitution and by-laws, but also to its regulations, practices and day-to-day dealings. The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would thus have direct application to and also throughout any corporation whose position gave it
power. The preconditions of application are two: the undeniable fact
that the corporation was created by the state and the existence of sufficient economic power concentrated in this vehicle to invade the constitutional right of an individual to a material degree.
This is new as a rule of law, but it is typically American in tradition. Instead of a social attack on an enterprise as an enterprise,
with nationalization or socialization as the aim, this is the application
of a set of general rules to the organisms and individuals who govern
them, with a view to achieving a freer order of individual life. Under
this theory certain human values are protected by the American Constitution; any fraction of the governmental system, economic as well
as legal, is prohibited from invading or violating them. The principle
is logical because, as has been seen, the modern state has set up, and
come to rely on, the corporate system to carry out functions for which
in modern life by community demand the government is held ultimately
responsible. It is unlimited because it follows corporate power whenever that power actually exists. It resolves the conflict between the
property notion that an owner can do what he likes with his own and
the governmental concept that a public agency is obliged to serve all
alike within strict constitutional limitations, evenhandedly, up to the
limit of its capacity. Instead of nationalizing the enterprise, this doctrine "constitutionalizes" the operation.
his area. He also was the political governor. The provisions of Magna Carta protecting the lords against their feudal overlord, the king, were clearly intended to
protect the economic as well as the political rights claimed by the feudal lords who
rose against King John. In succeeding centuries, the doctrine was naturally invoked
by the lesser orders to protect them against the feudal chiefs themselves. Invasion
of personality obviously can be accomplished by economic as well as by physical
or political action. Obviously when economic power derives from the state itself,
the theoretical condition leading to the emergence of Magna Carta and still later to
our own Constitutional Bill of Rights is present.
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The emergence of this doctrine is worth examination.
Corporations in early English law were in form, in fact, and in
legal cognizance a device by which the political state got something
done. They were far more like the bodies corporate we call "public
authorities" today. A ferry had to be run; a harbor needed wharves;
a colony needed to be developed; a particular line of industry needed
encouragement. A royal charter was granted with more or less defined privileges, frequently intended to attract capital. The state retained residual control over the operations which it could exercise
at pleasure. Few in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries would
have disputed that a corporation was an agency of the state-probably
not before the early nineteenth century, either in England or in the
United States.
Corporations were so regarded, it seems reasonably plain, when,
in 1787, the United States drafted its Constitution. A proposal was
made to the Constitutional Convention that the Federal Government
be given power to charter corporations; 19 this was referred to committee, and the committee reported negatively. Madison's Notes indicate the reason. Corporations were commonly regarded as state
monopolies; they were not too popular. They were also a powerful
agency by which the nascent Federal Government might enter, affect,
perhaps even control and dominate the commercial field. The specter
of national corporations deriving power from the Federal Government repelled the delegates. The proposal was dropped.
Later, the Supreme Court held that the Congress had power to
charter corporations incidental to, or in aid of, its governmental functions, the leading case being that of McCullough v. Maryland.20 There,
19. Mr. Pinkney proposed as a power to be granted to the legislative authority,
"to grant charters of incorporation." 2 MADISON'S REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 325 (Farrand ed. 1937).
Debate took place some three weeks
later, oddly enough on a motion of Benjamin Franklin to include canals as proper
subjects of Federal action along with post offices and post roads. Madison suggested
an enlargement of the motion to include a power, "to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might require & the legislative provisions of
individual States may be incompetent." The ensuing debate brought out the fact
that there would be considerable opposition; though Mr. Wilson thought that the
creation of mercantile monopolies was necessarily authorized by the power to regulate
trade, Colonel Mason was "afraid" of monopolies of every sort which he did not think
were by any means "already implied," and the Madison suggestion was abandoned.
A proposal to permit creation of corporations for canal purposes only was then lost
in committee by a vote of eight to three. Id. at 615, 616. Evidently there had been
considerable discussion outside of committee and off the floor of the Convention.
Unquestionably the real fear was that expressed by Mr. King, that the power to
incorporate would be associated with certain state acts establishing banks and the like,
a subject of contention in Philadelphia and New York.
20. 4 Wheat. 315 (U.S. 1819). The Court had some trouble because Alexander
Hamilton, in his report favoring the creation of the Bank of the United States, had
said that it must be "under private, not public, direction; under the guidance of individual interest, not public policy."-surely not the first time that the report of an
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incorporation of a national bank by the Congress was considered within
the powers delegated to the Federal Government because it was in
aid or implementation of the federal power to create a system of banking and currency. The doctrine of incidental power to incorporate has
been availed of continuously thereafter, but always with the underlying limitation that a federal charter may be granted as a means of
performing some function or exercising some power delegated to the
United States.
(With the power have come some of the sequelae the Constitutional Convention feared. In at least one recent case, it was held that
a corporation (even though privately owned) carrying out a function
of the United States was immune from state taxation and generally
immune from state legislation; this decision followed a concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in a case involving the Federal Reserve Board (likewise a body corporate), declaring that doctrine with
respect to the Board." The sequel certainly affirms the nature of
federal corporations. So far as concerns federal corporations, they
are by very hypothesis agencies of government. With this premise,
it would certainly follow that the action of a federally chartered corporation would be governed by the constitutional limitations imposed
on any agency of the Federal Government.)
By historical precedent, certainly at the outset, the situation of
state chartered corporations was the same; that is, they were agencies
of the chartering state. Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800,
when there were only 300 recorded corporations in the United States,
all of which derived their authority from the states or predecessor
colonies, the lawyer arguing that they were purely private and, because
private, not within the scope of constitutional limitations on governmental action would have had the difficult side of the argument."2
Executive Officer had later embarrassed the Court l Id. at 341. Chief Justice
Marshall brushed aside Mr. Hopkinson's argument: "The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or
levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power,
which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means
by which other objects are accomplished. . . . The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else."

Id. at 411.

21. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). Pittman v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939). Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943). The doctrine that it federal corporation is amenable only to
federal law came up argumentum in the case of Matter of New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad,
F.2d
in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Learned
Hand in the course of the argument noted his concern that federal corporations (like
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a party in that proceeding) might emerge
as instruments more or less immune from state law, thus having a specially favored
position in American commercial life.
22. There were few corporations existing in the United States when the Constitution was adopted in 1789. One writer estimated six. Baldwin, American Corpora-
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The case would have been otherwise in the latter part of the nineteenth century. By this time, the long battle had been fought about and
against specially chartered corporations. These had multiplied. General corporation laws had become common. The state legislatures had
virtually granted power to any group of private citizens to incorporate
and to carry on virtually any kind of business under the corporate
form, and had turned their backs on special charters. The corporation
had virtually become a mere method of business organization; it was
regarded as a private institution, and in the main really was. For corporate business was then in economic fact private. The operations of
the small shop, or of the small factory, did not attain a power-position
capable of invading personality save in rare instances, and these were
chiefly in the field of railroads and public utilities. True, the underlying premise remained and was steadily used by the courts: incorporation, even under general laws, was a state act designed to further a state
purpose, namely, the encouragement of trade and commerce (if nothing else)." Courts continued to insist that ultimate control over and
responsibility for the administration and functioning of the corporation
remained .with the state because the corporation's existence and functioning was an exercise of the sovereign political power of the state
itself. But, absent any economic power seriously to invade individual
life, it is not surprising that the constitutional question lay dormant.
The problem of protecting personality did come up in the fields
where concentrated corporate power chiefly existed: the service rendered by railroad systems. Here, instead of the direct constitutional
approach, the courts first dealt with the subject either as a matter of
classic public utility regulation or as regulation of interstate commerce
under the commerce clause. The current of authority is tortuous
though it gradually assumes fairly clear direction.
tions before 1789, 1 AMERICAN HISTORICAL AssocIATioN ANNUAL

REPORT 253, 254
Another writer, DAVIS, CORPORATIONS, A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE AuTHORITY OF THE STATE (1905), believes there was a slightly greater number.
Baldwin estimated that by 1800 some three hundred corporations had been chartered in
the thirteen states. Certainly there were not many; all of them were clearly created
in order to foster a project which the state desired to have carried out. Historically
it would seem hardly arguable that a corporation was pro tanto an "arm of the
state." Nor has there been any abandonment of the theory through generalization
of corporation laws and the free granting of the corporate privilege.
23. See Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943);
Havender et al. v. Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338

(1902).

(1940) : "The state has an interest in the corporate structures erected under its authority. Having provided for the mergers of corporations, they are not regarded with
disfavor. On the contrary, mergers are encouraged to the extent that they tend to
conserve and promote corporate interests." The theory is that the state through its
corporation laws is seeking to promote commercial activity and general economic
welfare. See Morris v. Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923).
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The first case slanted heavily against any great protection of
personality. In 1878, the United States Supreme Court decided, in
Hall v. DeCuir,2 4 that a Louisiana reconstruction statute requiring of
railroads and other common carriers such as steamboats that their
rules and regulations make no discrimination on account of race or
color, was unconstitutional. The court thought the statute interfered
with interstate commerce; in Chief Justice Waite's words (at p. 488) :
"State legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden on
interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom,
does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress."
A judgment in favor of a Negro who had been denied accommodations
in a section reserved for white passengers was accordingly reversed.2 5
The doctrine stood as late as the Chiles case in 1910, when a regulation of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad reserved a car for white passengers and a Negro brought action for being expelled from such a
car. When the case reached the Supreme Court the Court decided
that such a regulation was not prohibited by the Constitution since it
was not a burden on interstate commerce if "reasonable" by common
law standards. 6 This drove a wedge into Hall v. DeCuir, since it
logically followed from the Court's reasoning in the Chiles case that
an individual had justiciable interest in such regulations, and that regulations of the corporation if not "reasonable" might be unconstitutional,
at least as impeding the free flow of interstate commerce.
Meanwhile the Congress of the United States had intervened. In
1903, it had amended Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act so as
to make it unlawful for any carrier to subject any person to any undue
or any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage whatever. The Congress had in mind rebates and preferential rates and services. But
in Mitchell v. United States, the statute was held to give to all travelers
the right to equal facilities, though not to outlaw segregation.2 7 The
legal controversy as to what is "equal treatment" required to be afforded individuals by common carrier regulation is still going on.
Recent cases, such as Bob-Lo Excursion Company v. Michigan,2 8
24. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
25. Unquestionably the Supreme Court's decision in the case cited was influenced
by the growing tide of hostility towards reconstruction legislation generally. Even
so, the specific holding of the case merely prohibits state action on the ground that
the field was exclusively reserved to the Congress. At that time, of course, the doctrine had not emerged that individuals acquire direct rights through the first ten
Amendments to the Constitution and the interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments had not crystallized.
26. Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
27. 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
28. 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
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strongly suggest that Hall v. DeCuir and possibly even the holding
in the Chiles case that segregation is "reasonable" are no longer law.
"Reasonableness" presumably changes with the times and the community mores.
Without change of constitutional doctrine, one effect of Mitchell
v. United States was to introduce a new field in which rules of law
became applicable to corporate regulations and practices, as they affect
interstate commerce. The clear right of a corporation to make rules
and regulations and to adopt practices was recognized, but such rules
and practices must not "burden interstate commerce." If "reasonable," they do not burden interstate commerce; if "unreasonable,"
they do. It followed that within the interstate commerce field a rule
or practice must be reasonable; and one criterion of reasonableness
is whether without justification it improperly discriminates or differentiates between one individual and another. In practice, there is
little real difference between this criterion of "reasonableness" and the
criterion of "equal protection of the laws" applied to state action.
It does not appear to the writer that the field opened in the Mitchell case is limited to public utilities, though the rule-making practice
is more commonly exercised by public utility enterprises. A rule or
practice, for example, imposed by an oil company, a chain of gasoline
stations or even chain stores, could conceivably burden interstate commerce quite as much as any regulation of a railroad. If, for example,
a rule was made forbidding sale of gasoline to any car containing both
Negroes and whites, the case would squarely be presented.
III
A third line of authority involves the direct application of the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to corporate action and practices. If corporate regulations can be a burden
on interstate commerce, whose regulation is delegated to the Congress,
they may also be a burden on or denial of civil rights whose preservation is constitutionally guaranteed. This doctrine indeed had already
been stated by Mr. Justice Stone in Jones v. City of Opelika in the
case of a municipal corporation.2 9 But, four years later, the doctrine
0
was extended by the doctrine of Marsh v. Alabama.3
The substance
of the doctrine there laid down is that where a corporation is privately
performing a "public function," it is held to the constitutional standards
regarding civil rights and equal protection of the laws that apply to
29. 316 U.S. 584, 600-610 (1942).
30. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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the state itself. In the Marsh case, a corporation owned and operated
a company town. A company employee deputized to carry out minor
police functions arrested a Jehovah's Witness for distributing literature
and so forth on its streets, the specific charge being in the nature of
trespass on private property. The Court held that administration of
private property of such a town, though privately carried on, was
nevertheless in the nature of a "public function," that the private rights
of the corporation must therefore be exercised within constitutional
limitations, and the conviction for trespass was reversed. For those
interested in a clear distinction, the decision of Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan Life Co. is interesting.3' There the
company owned a large apartment house and a Jehovah's Witness insisted on the right to enter the corridors and halls of the building and
to call on the individual residents. The New York Court of Appeals
fully accepted the doctrine of Marsh v. Alabama, but held that operating the internal corridors of an apartment building was not a "public
function" in the same sense as operating streets in a company townan entirely reasonable line to draw.
It had been observed in Marsh v. Alabama that

"

.

the cor-

poration can no more deprive people of freedom of press and religion
than it can discriminate against commerce." 32
In Republic Aviation Corporation v. NLRB the Supreme Court
stated that the rights of private property must yield to rights created
by, federal statute. 8 A fortiori, this would be true in the case of rights
created by the Constitution itself. It remained only for a square holding that the Bill of Rights created individual, rights as well as limita-'
tions on governmental or state action.
Ana, shortly, such a decision came down. This was the now
4 a litigation attempting to enforce
famous case of Shelley v. Kraemer,"
a covenant prohibiting transfer of real property to a Negro. The
Court observed,
the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
rights established are personal rights." "
Without squarely holding that all covenants of the nature complained
of were void, the Court did hold that any process of law in a state court
enforcing them was action prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948).
326 U.S. at 501 n. 4.
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 22.
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In view of the square holding of the Court as to the existence of the
individual constitutional right, it was perhaps unnecessary to seek state
action and strike that down.
There remains as unfinished business the classic doctrine of the
Civil Rights Cases."6 There, it had been squarely decided that civil
rights of individuals, though guaranteed by the Constitution against
state aggression,
".. can not be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,

unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs
or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of any
individual unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private
wrong."
There is a gap in direct application of constitutional rules to corporate
action which the courts have not yet bridged. Jones v. Opelika was
a case involving a municipal corporation which, of course, was an arm
of the state. Marsh v. Alabama involved action of a private corporation, but it had invoked the state police power when it prosecuted for
trespass. Shelley v. Kraemer was a private covenant, but state power
had been invoked when the plaintiff petitioned to the state courts to
secure enforcement. The case remains open, so far as authority is
concerned, where the corporation is able to enforce its rule, or carry out
its practice, without calling on the state to assist in its enforcement.
Though the area is narrow in legalistics, it is immense in economics:
most corporate practices and regulations are directly applied. Invasion
of personality can come simply from refusal to sell or give service.
Some advances have been made even in this field. Corporations
or associations, private in character, but dealing with public rights,
have already been held subject to constitutional standards. Political
parties, for example, even though they surrender statutory organization and are in form private clubs are within this category. So also
are labor unions on which statutes confer the right of collective bargaining. Thus, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. it was ob37

served,

"If . . . the [Railway Labor] Act confers this power on
the bargaining representative of a craft . . . without any com-

mensurate statutory duty towards its members, constitutional
questions arise. For the representative is clothed with power not
unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is
36. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
37. 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
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also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect
those rights."
And a state court has held that a labor union can not be regarded as a
private association of individuals free of constitutional restraints, but
that the Fifth Amendment applies to all union officials exercising the
privileges granted them under federal statutes.8
Again, a private corporation leasing and operating a municipal
swimming pool is under a constitutional duty to adopt regulations giving equal protection to all citizens (Lawrence v. Hancock 39). The
private practice of a corporation (or apparently any aggregate body)
taken under or in furtherance of a privilege granted by the state falls
within the area of constitutional control.
But this strongly suggests that corporations enjoying privileges
of any kind under statutory arrangements, and acquiring power of
discrimination, may be held to like tests. The radio industry functions
almost entirely under the privileges and licenses granted by the Federal
Communications Commission; it would seem inconceivable that the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment should not apply to the corporations holding these licenses, certainly in their exercise of the license
privilege. And this would be true even outside the areas specifically
covered by the Federal Communications Act. Where, likewise, under
the provisions of the present Defense Production Act, an industry
Advisory Committee formulates and administers rules for industrial
allocation or, as in the case of credit, passes on the general standards
by which loans shall be granted or withheld and is correspondingly
granted immunity from antitrust law provisions, the principle would
apply. In these cases, the committees of the corporations constituting
them have become in some measure agencies of federal economic policy.
IV
Remains the final question: is a corporation, having achieved
economic power making discrimination possible, subject to constitutional tests as to its practices and regulations merely because it is a
corporation? Obviously the act done or practice adopted must really
invade personality contrary to some constitutional privilege, else there
is no wrong. In the absence of very considerable concentration of
economic power in a given area, the problem does not arise. But, if
there is power, accompanied by invasion of an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution, then it would seem that the mere enjoyment of a state corporate charter is sufficient justification for invok38. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).

39. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
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ing operation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It has
steadily been held that
"whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is
always a matter of state policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end which the State deems desirable." 40
Though the statement was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the course
of a dissenting opinion, this doctrine has never been questioned. It
is commonly invoked by state courts, and for that matter by corporations, to justify the right of a legislature to change or modify stockholders' rights. Implicitly, it would seem, state action in granting a
corporate charter assumes that the corporation will not exercise its
power (granted in theory at least to forward a state purpose) in a
manner forbidden the state itself. Mr. Justice Bradley's doctrine in
the Civil Rights Cases, that a private wrong does not offend the Constitution, ceases to have application if the wrong-doer is a corporation,
enjoying the corporate privilege and corporate powers by grant from
the state and thereby attaining a position giving it power to commit
the wrong.
It is here that the phenomenon of concentration becomes controlling. For concentration accomplishes two results. It sets up the
large corporations, members of the concentrate, as economic mechanisms on which the community and the public rely for goods or
services. Concentration means either no choice or a very limited choice
of suppliers of such goods or services. By reason of such a limited
choice, the members of the concentrate acquire power substantially
to invade constitutionally-created rights of personality. If there are
fifty stores in the vicinity from which an individual can satisfy his
needs, discriminatory practice by any one of them has little or no effect
on the individual. If there is a single chain of stores, the effect may
be to drive him out of the neighborhood.
One can imagine, for instance, a summer community, served
only by a chain store system which falls in with a local scheme to
exclude outsiders. Included in that scheme might be a refusal by
the chain store to serve those individuals on the same basis as the
others. On this theory, if the chain store really afforded the chief
supply function in the community, denial of such service would be denial
of equal protection of the laws, and possibly a taking- of property; and
court action would be to redress the wrong. Obviously the imposition of this class of liability does depend on actual power: were there
40. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933).
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twenty groceries in the vicinity, the fact that this one corporation pursued this peculiar course would not suffice. There would be no remedy,
there being no substantial impact. The corporation operating the
single store would not have power sufficient to affect seriously the
life of any individual. On the other hand, if substantially all these
stores were controlled by the same corporation, the power would be
obvious. The second basis-power residing in an instrumentality
created by the state-would be present, and the doctrine would come
into play. The denial by private employees of complainant's right to
deliver pamphlets on the streets of one mill town, dealt with in Marsh
v. Alabama, involved a mixture of corporate and "public" power. The
court argued that this denial of a constitutional right was carried out
by the corporation employee in substantial performance of public functions. But what made them "public" except the fact that the one
corporation owned the entire town? The whim of a single houseowner directed towards his tenants' religious practices might be private.
The prejudice of the owner of ninety per cent of the available housing would be a public matter. One may reasonably forecast, in the
future, direct application of constitutional limitations to the corporation, merely because it holds a state charter and exercises a degree
of economic power sufficient to make its practices "public" rules.
A fortiori, this would be true if the corporation occupied a special
status, always providing it had actual power to invade personality.
Thus, states commonly do limit the number of charters they will grant
to banks and insurance companies, as well as to public utilities. Special
status is accorded indeed to some corporations under the prevailing
federal plans for industrial regulation, a familiar one being exemption
from the antitrust laws. The "private" quality of a corporation under
these circumstances is no more visible than was the private quality of
the Bank of the United States in McCullough v. Maryland.
V
In this new field of constitutional law as applied to economic life
various areas of impact are apparent.
The first area of impact is that whose application has already been
forecast: the impact of the control of the economic organization on the
consumer or patron by restriction of its goods and services. This is
the case of the would-be customer of the chain store, of the would-be
tenant in a housing development, or the would-be patron of a gas and
light company. Or, for that matter, the case of the small manufacturer
seeking steel from the great organizations.
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A second prospective area of possibly emerging law extends into
the great and ill-defined field of access to business opportunity. It is
far more difficult, and almost completely uncharted. Thus companies
like the General Motors Corporation, or Standard Oil of New Jersey,
dispose of the livelihood of great numbers of individuals nominally
engaged in small private enterprises as agents for the sale of cars,
operators of small gasoline stations. Distribution of the product is a
necessity in rendering the service which the public appears to demand
of these concerns. The public would demand this service of the state
were private concerns not prepared to provide it. Can corporations
in the position of these powerful concerns discriminate as between man
and man and group and group in dealing with these areas of livelihoodopportunity? Can they withdraw a sales agency agreement from one
man because the general superintendent of the district dislikes him
or wishes to give the opportunity to a relative? And so on, through
the whole complicated gamut of operation from distribution back to
production.
There is no point in speculating here as to solutions which may be
reached tomorrow. The difficulties are evident. Authority to select
personnel, to judge the effectiveness of agents, and to adopt methods
of distribution or production is almost essential to the effective carrying out of any operation. Courts have long declined to enter the field
of business operation or to review the business judgment of corporate
managers. The modern state, either through its executive or legislative arm, would probably be cautious in entering the field for the same
reasons. This is, perhaps, the precise difference between the dogma
of socialism and the American doctrine of seeking, pragmatically, a
social result. Entry into internal operations means assumption of final
responsibility for the ultimate result. If American thinking tends to
look askance at the great corporate bureaucracies, it is even more distrustful of government bureaucracy.
It is allowable to forecast, therefore, that in this early stage of
economic constitutional law, the application will be primarily to the
impact of corporate power on consumers of goods and services; but that
the doctrine will be applied with extreme caution to operations of the
economic opportunities implicit in them.
The latter field suggests a development of the field of law we commonly call antitrust legislation. Here, undeniably, the doctrine of
"restraint of trade" can have application; but instead of a direct attempt
to apply specific rules, the effort is made to create an economic situation giving the maximum freedom of economic opportunity. When, in
1950, the American Government brought action against the American
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Telephone & Telegraph Company to require it to divest itself of its
huge subsidiary, the Western Electric Company, the specific ground
alleged was that American Telephone & Telegraph Company was the
only substantial American buyer of telephone equipment. So long as
it owned the manufacturing subsidiary, no outsider would have real
opportunity to sell equipment to the telephone company. Consequently,
the Government argued the ownership of this supplier by the telephone
monopoly "restrained trade." In conclusion, the Government sought
that the telephone company should not only divorce itself from its subsidiary, but should be required to satisfy its equipment needs by permitting any supplier to bid for contracts. Feeling its way in the new
field, the modern state sought application of the antitrust laws rather
than of a constitutional doctrine. We may forecast, perhaps, that,
for some time to come in the field of economic functioning, these rather
than the constitutional rules will be the area of impact in this new field
of legal and social thinking.

